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Supreme Court of Utah.
Ali S. YAZD and Parvin Yousefi, Plaintiffs and Respondents,
v.
WOODSIDE HOMES CORPORATION, Defendant and Petitioner.
No. 20050444.
Sept. 1, 2006.
Background: House purchasers brought action against vendor, alleging that vendor fraudulently
concealed information contained in a report about a deep layer of collapsible soil present on land
which vendor owned that was adjacent to the house. The Fourth District, Provo Department, Gary D.
Stgtt, J., granted vendor's motion for summary judgment. Purchasers appealed, and the Court of
Appeals, 109._P.3d 3_93_, reversed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
Holdings: The Supreme Court, Nehrinq, J., held that:
(_1) a developer-builder may owe his buyer a duty to disclose information known to him concerning
real property, including property other than that conveyed to the buyer, when that information is
material to the condition of the property purchased by the buyer;
(2) genuine issue of material fact as to whether report describing collapsible soil conditions on
adjacent land owned by vendor was "material" precluded summary judgment; and
(3) genuine issue of material fact as to whether report could be expected to influence the judgment of
purchasers buying house, such that information was important and material, precluded summary
judgment.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
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On Certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals

NEHRING, Justice:

H 1 When Ali Yazd and Parvin Yousefi's Lindon, Utah home sank into the unstable *285 soil upon
which it lay, they sued. They claimed that home-seller Woodside Homes fraudulently concealed
information contained in a report, the "Delta report," about a deep layer of collapsible soil present on
land that Woodside owned adjacent to the Yazd-Yousefi property.
H 2 The district court granted Woodside's motion for summary judgment and dismissed the YazdYousefi fraudulent concealment claims. It based its ruling on the undisputed fact that Woodside was
unaware of unsuitable soil conditions either on the Yazd-Yousefi land or elsewhere in its development.
The court of appeals reversed.
H 3 We granted certiorari. We affirm the court of appeals' reversal of summary judgment. However,
we reverse the court of appeals' holding that the Delta report was material as a matter of law. We
also correct the court of appeals' misapprehension that the materiality of the Delta report is relevant
to whether Woodside owed the homeowners a duty to disclose the contents to them. Finally, we hold
that a developer-builder may owe his buyer a duty to disclose information known to him about the
composition or characteristics of any real property when that information is material to the suitability
of the property purchased by the buyer.

BACKGROUND
H 4 In the early 1990s, Woodside undertook the development of the Panorama Point subdivision in
Lindon, Utah. The subdivision included three parcels of land, the last of which was purchased in 1992
from the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, which we will call the "Church." The Church had
intended to construct a large structure on the property. The Church abandoned this plan, however,
after the Delta report (named after the firm which compiled it) revealed that an excess of moisturesensitive collapsible soil made the site unsuitable for the contemplated building. The Delta report did
not specifically evaluate the suitability of the site for a single family residence.
11 5 The Church agreed to sell the parcel of property to Woodside. According to the sales contract, the
Church was to provide a copy of the Delta report to Woodside. Woodside claims it never saw the
report.
U 6 Before the Yazd-Yousefi home was built, Woodside obtained its own study of the soil conditions on
two other parcels that comprised Panorama Point. The Yazd-Yousefi lot was within the area covered
by the study. The soil study indicated the presence of collapsible soil to an average depth of
approximately two and one-half feet. Accordingly, Woodside formulated a plan to dig out the
collapsible soil and reduce the grade of these parcels between six and eight feet. After the work was
completed, William Gordon, an engineer, inspected the area at the behest of Woodside and
pronounced the soil fit to support a house. In 1995, Mr. Yazd and Ms. Yousefi contracted with
Woodside to purchase a lot and build a home in Panorama Point. Woodside did not disclose the
contents of the Delta or Woodside's own soil reports to Mr. Yazd or Ms. Yousefi.
U 7 Mr. Yazd and Ms. Yousefi moved into their home in September 1995. By 1996, cracks appeared in
the foundation and the driveway. Doors would not open or close. Evidence of excessive settling
abounded. Mr. Yazd and Ms. Yousefi accepted Woodside's efforts to repair the damage until April
2002 when a prospective purchaser of the home discovered that, owing to the instability of the soil,
major repairs would be required to shore-up the house and prevent additional damage.
H 8 With this discovery, Mr. Yazd and Ms. Yousefi decided to seek legal relief. They sued Woodside.
They alleged that Woodside's failure to disclose the presence of the collapsible soil in the area
amounted to a breach of contract and fraudulent nondisclosure. The district court referred the YazdYousefi contract claims to arbitration; these claims do not concern us here. The district court then
dismissed the Yazd-Yousefi fraudulent nondisclosure and concealment claims. The district court based
its ruling on a determination that Woodside had neither real nor constructive knowledge of the
continued presence of collapsible soil on the buyers' lot.
H 9 On appeal, the court of appeals reversed and remanded the case to the district court. The court of

appeals concluded that *286 the Delta report did contain material information that Woodside had a
duty to disclose to the buyers and, since the question of whether Woodside actually had knowledge of
the report was in dispute, that summary judgment was improperly granted.

ANALYSIS

B
[1]
11 10 In order to prevail on a claim of fraudulent concealment, a plaintiff must prove "(1) that
the nondisclosed information is material, (2) that the nondisclosed information is known to the party
failing to disclose, and (3) that there is a legal duty to communicate/' Mitchell v. Christensen, 2001
UT80, H 9, 31 P.3d 572. These elements are presented in inverse order of importance. As we will
see, this reverse ordering of elements may have led the court of appeals to apply a flawed analytical
process that nevertheless yielded the correct result: a reversal of the district court.
I. WOODSIDE'S RELATIONSHIP WITH MR. YAZD AND MS. YOUSEFI CREATED A LEGAL DUTY

H
[2]
H 11 We have stated that " [ i ] t is axiomatic that one may not be liable to another in tort
absent a duty." Loveland v. Orem City Corp., 746 P.2d 763, 765 (Utah 1987). Any analysis of a tort
claim, then, begins with an inquiry into the existence and scope of the duty owed the plaintiff by the
defendant.

[3]
U 12 The court of appeals, however, began its analysis by examining the materiality of the
Delta report following the sequence of elements set out in Mitchell. The court of appeals then wasted
little time reaching the conclusion that u [t]here is little question that the information contained in the
Delta report would have been material to the Buyers in this case/' Yazd v. Woodside Homes Corp.,
2005 UT App 82, fl 9, 109 P.3d 393.
H 13 With its finding of materiality in hand, the court of appeals moved on to the matter of duty. The
court appeared to link the materiality of the Delta report to the existence of Woodside's duty when it
stated, "We can say, however, that if Woodside possessed the Delta report, or had knowledge of its
content, prior to the sale with the Buyers, it had a duty to disclose the information to the Buyers." Id.
H 10. It is important that the court of appeals' opinion not be read to suggest that the materiality of
the Delta report created Woodside's duty to disclose the contents of the report to Mr. Yazd and Ms.
Yousefi. Indeed, materiality becomes an issue only after a legal duty has been established.

£41
H 14 The determination of whether a legal duty exists falls to the court. It is a purely legal
question, and since in the absence of a duty a plaintiff will not be entitled to a remedy, it is the first
question to be answered. See Lgxeland^_746J>_.2d_atJ66.

EL

£5]
H 15 From where does a duty arise? To properly answer the duty question, a court must
understand that the structure and dynamics of the relationship between the parties gives rise to the
duty. 'The question of whether a duty exists is a question of law. As always, resolution of this issue
begins with an examination of the legal relationships between the parties, followed by an analysis of
the duties created by these relationships/' Id.

£61
£21
H 16 A relationship that is highly attenuated is less likely to be accompanied by a
duty than one, for example, in which parties are in privity of contract. Age, knowledge, influence,
bargaining power, sophistication, and cognitive ability are but the more prominent among a multitude

of life circumstances that a court may consider in analyzing whether a legal duty is owed by one party
to another. Where a disparity in one or more of these circumstances distorts the balance between the
parties in a relationship to the degree that one party is exposed to unreasonable risk, the law may
intervene by creating a duty on the advantaged party to conduct itself in a manner that does not
reward exploitation of its advantage.

{81
{91
11 17 Legal duty, then, is the product of policy judgments applied to relationships.
DeBrv v. Vallev Mortgage Co., 835 P.2d 1000, 1003-04 (Utah Ct.App.1992) ("Duty is not sacrosanct
in itself, but only an expression of the sum total of those considerations*287 of policy which lead the
law to say that the particular plaintiff is entitled to protection." (internal quotation marks and brackets
omitted)). A person who possesses important, even vital, information of interest to another has no
legal duty to communicate the information where no relationship between the parties exists.

[10]
[11]
H 18 An example which illustrates this point is the "special relationship" doctrine in
tort law. A person has no legal duty to protect another person from the conduct of a stranger unless
the person upon whom a duty is sought to be imposed has a "special relationship" with either the
stranger or the potential victim. Rather, "[t]he duty to control another person may arise where a
special relationship exists." Wilson y^ Valley Mental Healthy 9_69_P.2d 416, 419 { U t a J i l 9 9 8 ) ; see also
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 315 (1977) (stating that a duty is premised on a special
relationship); Higgins v. Salt Lake County, 855 P.2d 231 f 236 (Utah 1993) (adopting Restatement
position). Here, it is Woodside's status as builder-contractor that gives rise to its legal duty to the
home buyers. The communication of material information to Mr. Yazd and Ms. Yousefi is one of the
obligations that flow from Woodside's assumption of its legal duty.
H 19 There are occasionally instances in which a court is called upon to make policy choices based on
assessments of social, economic, and technological conditions. To cite but one example, the
maturation of the industrial revolution and, in particular, the ever lengthening chain of participants in
the manufacture of goods cut deeply into the doctrines of caveat emptor and privity of contract that
had served well an agrarian and economically insular nation prior to the last century. This changed in
MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., where Justice Cardozo held that manufacturers must exercise
reasonable care to protect consumers and others who, despite a lack of privity or direct contractual
contact with the manufacturer, may come into contact with their products. 217 N.Y. 382, 390, 111
ISLE. 1050 (1916).

[12]
H 20 Typically, courts cede authority over matters of policy to the political branches of
government. When policy considerations bear on a subject lodged firmly within the court's sphere,
like the common law, it is entirely appropriate for the court to make the policy judgments necessary
to get the law right.
H 21 We have never explicitly recognized that a duty is owed to buyers of homes by buildercontractors. Insofar as we have signaled a willingness to impose this duty, it has been by indirection
and expressed in dictum. In Smith v. Frandsen, 2004 UT 55, H 9, 94 P.3d 919, we turned away an
attempt by the Smiths, owners of a home that had been constructed on unsuitable soil, to impose a
duty on the developer of the subdivision where the home was located. Our reasons for doing so had
as much to do with the conclusions that we reached about the scope of knowledge acquired and the
responsibility assumed by the Smiths' contractor-builder as with the issue of whether the developer
knew of the poor soil conditions and whether that knowledge was material.
H 22 Our focus in Smith was not on whether the relationship between the Smiths and their buildercontractor imposed a legal duty to disclose information about soil conditions. After all, the buildercontractor was not a party to the lawsuit. The inquiry into the builder-contractor's role was, instead,
directed at whether parity existed between what the builder-contractor knew about the condition of
the soil that lay beneath the Smiths' house and the developer's knowledge of the same soil instability.

This was relevant to our analysis of the developer's duty because we had formerly indicated that a
remote purchaser who had no privity of contract with a developer might nevertheless recover for
breach of the developer's duty to disclose unsuitable soil conditions to a previous unsophisticated
purchaser who had no knowledge of the adverse conditions. Id. % 25,
% 23 Smith required us to define limits on the right to recover from remote parties. One limiting
principle that we recognized and applied in Smith was that a duty to disclose material information is
extinguished once the information is communicated or otherwise acquired by the party to whom the
duty was owed. Id. H 17.
*288 H 24 Modern home construction requires a high degree of knowledge and expertise, including
knowledge of soil conditions. We have found that the disparity in skill and knowledge between home
buyers and builder-contractors leads buyers to rely on the builder-contractor's expertise. Based on
these observations, we chose to adopt in Loveland, 746 P.2d 763, a statement of duty borrowed from
Wyoming o f " 'reasonable care to insure that the subdivided lots are suitable for construction of some
type of ordinary, average dwelling house and he must disclose to his purchaser any condition which
he knows or reasonably ought to know makes the subdivided lots unsuitable for such residential
building/ " Id. at 769 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Anderson v. Bauer, 681 P.2d 1316 (Wyo.1984)).
\ 25 The imposition of this duty had the effect in Smith of imputing to the builder-contractor the
knowledge of deficient soil conditions that the Smiths accused the developer of failing to disclose to
them. The imputation of this knowledge, however, cut off any duty the developer may otherwise have
owed to future owners of the property, including the Smiths.
H 26 Although we did not recognize the duty of the builder-contractor in the context of a direct action
for recovery brought by a home buyer in Smith, we today extend its application to that setting. To do
otherwise would fatally undermine the legitimacy of our reasoning in Smith.

I I . THE MATERIALITY OF THE DELTA REPORT IS IN DISPUTE AND PROPERLY LEFT TO THE FINDER OF
FACT TO DETERMINE

[13]
H 27 The court of appeals held the Delta report to be material as a matter of law. Woodside
takes issue with this determination for three reasons: the Delta report did not concern the YazdYousefi lot, the court of appeals misread the Delta report in ways that led it to believe it was relevant
to the Yazd-Yousefi lot when it was not, and Woodside's soil study on the Panorama Point property
including the Yazd-Yousefi lot superseded any materiality to which the Delta report might make claim.
U 28 We do not believe that the Delta report has earned the designation of "material" as a matter of
law and therefore reverse the court of appeals on this point. Neither do we accept Woodside's
invitation to stamp the Delta report "immaterial" as a matter of law. Rather, we find that the question
of the report's materiality is best suited for the finder of fact to answer.
% 29 Woodside's contention that the Delta report cannot be material because it describes soil
conditions on land other than the Yazd-Yousefi lot has little to recommend it. Property boundaries are
seldom drawn with soil composition in mind, and information about the suitability of soil for
supporting a dwelling would more likely than not be relevant to predicting the soil conditions on
similar adjacent land. We decline to categorically deem immaterial all information concerning property
not owned by the party affected by unsuitable soil conditions. For the purpose of determining
materiality in this case, property boundaries are legally insignificant.
H 30 Whatever errors in interpreting the Delta report may have predisposed the court of appeals to
conclude that the report was material as a matter of law were not so significant as to persuade us to
summarily rule the report immaterial. The Delta report disclosed soil instability of a magnitude that
caused the Church to scuttle its building plans for the site. There were no obvious physical or
topographical features that would distinguish the Church parcel from the other portions of Panorama

Point. In our view, these considerations are sufficient to place the question of the Delta report's
materiality in dispute.
H 31 Finally, we reject Woodside's assertion that by commissioning its own soil study on property that
included the Yazd-Yousefi lot, it rendered immaterial all other information bearing on the soil
conditions at Panorama Point. Woodside insists that it had no knowledge of the Delta report. Based on
this assertion, its soil study was necessarily prepared without the benefit of information contained in
the Delta report concerning conditions on the adjacent parcel. At this stage * 2 8 9 of the litigation, we
do not know whether knowledge of soil conditions on the Church parcel would have affected the
Woodside soil report. Certainly, it is possible that it could. If the finder of fact were to determine that
Woodside knew of the Delta report but failed to inform its soils expert of its existence and contents,
the weight of the Woodside soil report could be substantially diminished.

I I I . WE REFINE THE DEFINITION OF "MATERIALITY" IN THE CONTEXT OF MATTERS THAT MUST BE
COMMUNICATED BY A BUILDER-CONTRACTOR

[14]
U 32 In holding that the Delta report was material as a matter of law, the court of appeals
relied on a definition of materiality as " 'something which a buyer or seller of ordinary intelligence and
prudence would think to be of some importance in determining whether to buy or sell/ " Yazd v.
Woodside Homes Corp., 2005 UT App 82, H 9, 109 P.3d 393 (emphasis in original) (quoting
Hermansen JA Tasulis, 2002JUT_52, S-29, 4_8_P._3d 235). In particular, the court of appeals focused on
the word "some" in the definition. We confess that "some" as used in our description of materiality is
ambiguous. When used in a context in which additional precision concerning quantity or quality is
sought, the word "some" is inherently ambiguous. "Some" is a word that refers to an unspecified
quantity or quality. It is a word that diminishes precision, not adds to it. When the young man
proclaims to his mother-in-law, "That was some dinner," we are left with considerable uncertainty
about the mother-in-law's talents as a chef. We believe that when the court of appeals stated that
"we cannot say as a matter of law that the information would not have been of some interest to the
Buyers," id±+ it treated "some" in a way that would permit matters of lesser importance to qualify as
material. This interpretation is not what we intended.
H 33 We take this opportunity to clarify the definition of materiality as the term is used as an element
of fraudulent concealment and fraudulent nondisclosure. We believe that requisite clarity can be
achieved by deleting the word "some" from the definition we adopted in Hermansen, 2002 UT 52, %
29, 48 P.3d 235.

H

[15]
U 34 To be material, the information must be "important." Importance, in turn, can be
gauged by the degree to which the information could be expected to influence the judgment of a
person buying property or assenting to a particular purchase price. In this case, we conclude that a
finder of fact could reasonably find that the contents of the Delta report meet this definition of
materiality. Therefore, we decline to pass on the status of the Delta report as a matter of law.

CONCLUSION
H 35 The three elements of fraudulent concealment are best described in this order: (1) there is a
legal duty to communicate information, (2) the nondisclosed information is known to the party failing
to disclose, and (3) the nondisclosed information is material. In this case, these elements are yet to
be adjudicated and remain to be proved. The most important element is the existence of a duty,
which arises from the relationship between the parties. We hold that a developer-builder may owe his
buyer a duty to disclose information known to him concerning real property, including property other
than that conveyed to the buyer, when that information is material to the condition of the property
purchased by the buyer. Both knowledge of the Delta report and its importance to the buyers remain
contested factual issues that bear on the existence of a duty. Thus, we affirm the court of appeals'

reversal of summary judgment.
% 36 Finally, we reverse the court of appeals' holding that the Delta report was material as a matter
of law. We leave the trier of fact to determine whether the Delta report was known to Woodside and
whether its content was sufficiently important such that its disclosure would have influenced the
decisions made by the buyers with respect to this property.

H 37 Chief Justice DURHAM, Associate Chief Justice WILKINS, Justice DURRA1MT, and Judge
CHRISTIANSEN concur in Justice NEHRING's opinion.
*290 H 38 Having disqualified herself, Justice PARRISH does not participate herein; District Judge
TERRY L. CHRISTIANSEN sat.

Utah,2006.
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143 P.3d 283, 559 Utah Adv. Rep. 44, 2006 UT 47
END OF DOCUMENT
Xz West Reporter Image (PDF)
(C) 2007 Thomson/West. No Claim to Ong. U.S. Govt. Works.

